#### MORNING MEETING - 28 February 1979

The DCI was in the chair.

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1. I briefed on the situation in Vietnam.

Richard Lehman NIO/Warning



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## MORNING MEETING - 26 February 1979

The DCI was in the chair.

- 1. I briefed at some length on the war in Indochina and on the Sino-Soviet frontier making the major point that the Chinese were not fighting well and were in a strong position vis-a-vis the Vietnamese.
- 2. I then mentioned three areas that I thought were of immediate concern.
  - -- It was becoming increasingly clear that that Khomeini/Bazargan are unable to bring the situation under control and may well be overwhelmed by the left.
  - In Lebanon the Christians are preparing for another round with the Syrians at a time when Arab defense force is melting away.

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3. The Director asked that OSR do a study of specific Soviet options for action along the Chinese border. He accepted my recommendation that alert memoranda be prepared on Iran and Lebanon and

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## THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

|      |   | WASHINGTON, D. C. 20303  | •  |
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|      | National Intelligence Office  |  | Copy N25X  |
| ,    | National Intelligence Officers  |  | 26 February 1979   |
|      | MEMORANDUM FOR: I   | Director of Central Intelligence   |  |
|      | VIA:  | Deputy Director for National Forei<br>National Intelligence Officer for  | gn Assessment<br>Warning   |
| ;    | FROM:   | Robert C. Ames<br>National Intelligence Officer for<br>South Asia  |  |
|      | SUBJECT:  | Monthly Warning Assessment: Near   | East and South Asia 25X  |
|      |   |  |  |
| 25X1 | rearming, tion with the Syri the Syrians must l and are just as in field a meaningful the renewed daily battles that will | The Christian militias are stepping in anticipation of ans. The Christian leadership remeave Lebanon. The Syrians have restransigent. Unless the Lebanese of army to replace the Syrians at vaflare ups will, once again, break occur not only in Beirut, but also have strengthened their presence. | of another confronta-<br>mains adamant that<br>corded this build-up<br>povernment is able to<br>crious "hot points"<br>out into full-scale |
|      | ' coupled with a poo  | Continued strikes staged by leftir economic performance and an appacause for the concern   | st controlled unions,<br>rent no-win war in / 25X  |
| 0EV4 | issue has coalesce<br>simmer, the more l  | d these factors into a crisis, but<br>ikely an issue, probably Sahara-re   | To date no single<br>the longer they<br>lated, will emerge.  |
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4. <u>Iran</u> - Khomeini does not appear to be in full control in the highly radicalized environment in Iran. The strength of the left is growing and coalescing, while it must appear to them that Khomeini is indecisive and organizationally weak. It appears Khomeini will either have to negotiate with the left—thereby lending it legitimacy—or challenge it. Because he has no organized military or security force, a challenge could lead to all out civil war, which the left is better organized to handle. Unless Khomeini lets Bazargan start running the country and reorganizing the military quickly, the left will soon be in a position to call for inclusion in the government or a fight.

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7. Iraq-Syria Rapprochement - The surprisingly rapid pace of cooperation between Iraq and Syria back in November and December waned considerably when the Egyptian-Israeli treaty negotiations stagnated. However, rapprochement could be given renewed impetus if an Egyptian-Israeli treaty is signed or if Iraq becomes even more concerned about the potential for instability from the Islamic Republic of Iran.

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Robert C. Ames

Several factors lead us to believe that renewed heavy fighting in Beirut between Christian militias and Syrian forces is likely during the next two months or so:

- Lebanon's basic problems remain unresolved, and there is no evidence that either the Syrians or the Christians are ready to make the concessions that would be necessary if renewed fighting is to be avoided.
  - -Warmer weather will remove a serious restraint on Christian leaders, who were reluctant to engage in major fighting while their followers-including numerous refugees-faced the rigors of winter.
- -The mandate of the Syrian-dominated Arab Deterrent Force comes = up for renewal on April 26. The period of the last renewal—in late October—was the last flashpoint for heavy fighting.
- —Developments that led to the fighting six months ago are already being repeated:
  - -Fighting in Beirut has gradually, but steadily, escalated over the past few weeks.
  - -Christian leaders this week launched a propaganda campaign against renewal.



Once fighting begins, there will be risks of added complications:

- -Syria and Israel could be drawn into direct conflict
- —The Syrian military will become more restless over suffering casualties in a situation it cannot fully contral.
- -Although it soems unlikely, Assad could decide to pull out—a move that would precipitate renewed civil war in Lebanon.

Christian militia provocations in southern Lebanon, together with Palestinian terrorist raids into Israel, also threaten to lead to wider conflict in the south.

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#### MORNING MEETING - 2 February 1979

1. The DCI chaired the meeting.

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2. Iran: Khomeini is to have a press conference tomorrow morning at which he is expected to announce his Islamic council. There is some suggestion that Bakhtiar may resign and then head a caretaker government under the council, thus resolving the immediate impasse. Basically, however, nobody knows what Khomeini may do and if he remains totally intransigent, we will continue on the course to civil war.

| 3. Indochina:  |
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| We have beginning to be werried that the   |
| We are beginning to be worried that the Chinese objective is not limited to winning a border flight, but rather may be Hanoi itself. With most of the Vietnamese army entangled in Kampuchea, the temptation must be high to "solve" the Vietnamese problem once and for all. The possibilities of miscalculation are very high, and we have to ask ourselves what the Soviets will do if the Chinese objective is as suggested. |
| There is a ring of 1914 to all this, and Austria has marched on Serbia.  |

4. The Director asked for an assessment of likely Soviet reactions to such a scenario.

Richard Lehman

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